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Abstract:  
The purpose of this thesis is to merge research on public opinion and foreign policy 
within political science with research from psychology on the impact of images on perceptions. 
The central question for this thesis asks if a political leader can shape public opinion about a 
country and its actions based on the image invoked in the leaders discourse. This research argues 
that public opinion is an important factor in foreign policy decision making, specifically in the 
decision to use force. Political leaders use speeches to communicate their policies to the public. 
In turn the speeches affect the publics' perceptions and opinions about the topic of the political 
leaders speech. The magnitude and direction of the response in public opinion is influenced by 
the successful invocation of images by the political leader. Not all images are created equal, 
specific images may resonate stronger with a population; therefore, it is important to explore the 
differences in image type used by leaders. This research blends affective approaches to image 
theory with cognitive approaches adding in public opinion. The final section of this thesis details 
future tests for this new approach to image theory.  
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Chapter I: Introduction 
After an international crisis the public looks to political leaders for information. In times 
of crisis when information is low, the political leader of a country can use speeches to shape 
public opinion about an event and the actors involved. A political leader can frame the situation 
in specific ways to mobilize popular support for a prescribed action. When leaders connect these 
frames with emotional responses, public support is expected to increase. Emotional responses of 
speeches can be studied by looking at the images that leaders invoke during a speech. Images, 
such as the diabolical enemy image and the ally image are expected to interact with emotional 
responses of the public that increase support or approval of the political leaders‘ agenda.  
The purpose of this thesis is to merge research on public opinion and foreign policy 
within political science with research from psychology on the impact of images on perceptions. 
The central question for this thesis asks if a political leader can shape public opinion about a 
country and its actions based on the image invoked in the leaders discourse. This research argues 
that public opinion is an important factor in foreign policy decision making, specifically in the 
decision to use force. Political leaders use speeches to communicate their policies to the public. 
In turn the speeches affect the publics' perceptions and opinions about the topic of the political 
leaders speech. The magnitude and direction of the response in public opinion is influenced by 
the successful invocation of images by the political leader. Not all images are created equal, 
specific images may resonate stronger with a population; therefore, it is important to explore the 
differences in image type used by leaders.  
This research is not limited to the ability of the President of the United States to invoke 
images in his or her speeches. Conceptually this theory's application extends beyond the United 
States to include all democracies. For the purpose of this paper, the political leader is defined as 
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the leader of the government, such as the President in the United States, the Prime Minister in the 
United Kingdom, and the Chancellor in Germany. This does not indicate that the people in these 
positions are the only leaders able to use images to shape public opinion, but research into the 
ability of other elites, such as party and media, is beyond the scope of this discussion.  
This thesis focuses on democratic governments given the expected relationship between 
public opinion and democracy. Government for the people by the people is a common definition 
of democracy (Schattschneider 1975). Democratic ideals dictate that the citizens are involved in 
the operations of government primarily by electing leaders to make policy. Representatives are 
expected to respond to the will of the people, when making decisions about government and 
policy. Foreign policy provides a problem for this simple model of responsiveness. If the public 
has no knowledge of foreign affairs, how do they form their opinion for leaders to implement? 
Previous research focuses on political leaders leading the public and the public leading the 
policy, with a strong preference given to research on the U.S. president (e.g. Cohen 1995; Foyle 
2004; Kohut 2009; Ostrom and Job 1986; Page et al. 1987; Shapiro and Jacobs 2000). The focus 
on the U.S. president is logical, American political scientists conduct most of these studies, the 
U.S. president is the only elected leader in the U.S. who deals directly with foreign policy and 
he/she is the only U.S. leader elected by the entire country. Integral to this research is the 
connection between public opinion and foreign policy. A large body of research debates the 
importance of public opinion to foreign policy decision making (Cohen 1973; Foyle 2004;  
Holsti 2002; Page and Shapiro 1983; Sobel 2001). This thesis argues that public opinion matters 
to political leaders when making foreign policy decisions.  
This thesis proceeds as follows. In the first section it discusses the evolution of research 
on public opinion and policy, both domestic and foreign. The purpose of this section is to 
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establish that public opinion is an important consideration for leaders. The second section details 
research dedicated to image theory within psychology and political science. The section 
discusses the past applications of image theory to foreign policy concepts establishing the 
premise that images can influence beliefs and opinions. The third section of this paper outlines 
the research design proposed to test the theory developed in this paper, that images used by 
political leaders can be used to shape public opinion about foreign policy. This section outlines 
specific details of how each image is conveyed to the public and the expected effects. This 
section introduces a possible coding scheme that would delineate which image a leader invokes 
in his speech. Finally, this section discusses future research questions and hypotheses for 
research on this topic.  
 
 
4 
 
Public Opinion  
Before addressing how leaders use images in speeches to influence public opinion about 
policy, it is important to discuss whether public opinion matters for foreign policy decisions. This 
is a crucial point to address because if public opinion does not constrain leaders, then leaders 
have no incentive to manipulate public opinion in the first place. It is important to discuss the 
evolution of research on public opinion of both domestic policy and foreign policy because 
insights can be derived from domestic policy and applied to foreign policy. It is equally 
important to note that there may be differences in how public opinion influences policy at the 
domestic and foreign level across different democracies. Research on public opinion and foreign 
policy should not be limited to the U.S. style of government. Political leaders in parliamentary 
systems may also use images in their speeches to influence public opinion. For this reason 
research in this section not only addresses the role of public opinion in the United States, but also 
includes research conducted in Europe as well.  
Public Opinion and Policy 
Political scientists have investigated the responsiveness of politicians to public opinion 
extensively (e.g Miller and Stokes 1963; Monroe 1998; Page and Shapiro 1983). These studies 
are important in determining whether elected officials are reactive to public opinion or 
dismissive, but they do not adequately address public opinion formation. Democratic 
governments are expected to be influenced by public opinion during the policy making process 
according to theories of democratic responsiveness (Stimson, et al. 1995).  Many studies have 
been conducted on the nature of public opinion and policy within the United States (Miller and 
Stokes 1963; Page and Shapiro 1983). Research at the domestic level predominantly focuses on 
democratic responsiveness, they do not measure how responsive a government is to public 
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opinion (Monroe 1998). Studies indicate that a key variable of whether public policy responds to 
public opinion is the salience of an issue (Zaller 1992). Issues that have higher levels of salience 
typically have higher levels of correlation between a policy adopted and a constituency 
preference. ―If public opinion is roughly the same in most districts (as is often the case), then it 
can have little explanatory power for legislative behavior‖ (Monroe 1998). Salience is an 
important indicator of whether public opinion will be congruent with policy. 
Two main approaches developed to study democratic responsiveness within the literature; 
the congruence model and the consistency model. The congruence approach uses questions from 
multiple surveys to measure opinion change and then policy change, if opinion and policy 
change in the same direction then congruence occurs (Page and Shapiro 1983). The consistency 
approach ―takes surveys done at one point in time and compares the distribution of public 
opinion with policy outcome‖ (Monroe 1998, p 9). The approaches suffer from similar 
shortcomings, they do not prove causality nor can they refute the possibility of spuriousness; 
however, a lack in consistency indicates that public opinion would have no impact on policy.   
Early research in this area produced inconclusive results. Miller and Stokes indicate that 
representatives and their constituents' policy preferences on issues of  social welfare and civil 
rights have high levels of congruence, while there was no discernible pattern of agreement on 
foreign affairs (1963). Page and Shapiro find high levels of policy congruence, approximately 
70% on domestic issues (1983). Their analysis indicated that changes in policy occurred after 
changes in public opinion a majority of the time (Page and Shapiro 1983). Monroe finds a drop 
in congruence from earlier studies in his analysis, but congruence remained (1998).  These mixed 
findings led researchers to conclude ―[w]e can be confident only that public opinion, whatever its 
sources and quality, is a factor that genuinely affects government policies in the United States‖ 
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(Page and Shapiro 1983, p 189). Politicians are found to cater to public opinion, whether because 
they feel it is their duty, because they agree with the policy, or because they desire to be re-
elected, does not matter. The evidence shows that public opinion has an influence on domestic 
policy. These studies are unable to show whether there is a reciprocal effect of political 
leadership on public opinion. Public opinion's impact on policy is important, and to ignore where 
the public gets its opinion is a gross oversight in the literature.   
Sources of Domestic Public Opinion 
While democratic responsiveness is a worthwhile area to explore, it is just as vital to 
consider where public opinion originates. If, as described by the democratic responsiveness 
argument, elected officials should create policy that is congruent with their constituents‘ desires, 
then the source of opinion has an impact on the policy implemented.  This question is important 
because democratic governments are expected to respond to their constituent‘s preferences (Dahl 
1989).  Research has shown that in the U.S. and Europe political leaders respond to public 
opinion in some circumstances (Eichenberg and Dalton 1993; Miller and Stokes 1963). The 
question remains that if there is an influence of public opinion on policy, where did public 
opinion originate? Contemporary literature focuses on the role that elites, particularly political 
and media, play in the formation of public opinion. Most studies that focus on political elites 
focus on the president (Cohen 1995; Kohut 2009; Ostrom and Job 1986). The President's 
prominence in the media and accountability to the country as a whole indicate that he would 
have the influence required to shift public opinion. 
Research regarding public opinion formation within the United States is often 
inconclusive and conflicting (Monroe 1998; Ragsdale 1984). Researchers disagree about how 
much of an influence presidents have on public opinion, some say that the influence is minimal 
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(Ostrom and Job 1986), while others argue that the president is capable of leading the mass 
public on specific topics (Cohen and Hamman 2003).  The role of the media has been explored 
no less extensively, with similar results (e.g. Page et al. 1987; De Vreese and Boomgaarden 
2006).  Much research has tried to tease out the influences of the media and political leaders on 
public opinion. 
Media and Domestic Public Opinion 
The news media is an important source of information. Most people only interact with 
government via the media and elections (Dalton et al. 1998). Few people attend political rallies 
or participate in politics themselves. Their only source for information about politics is therefore 
the news media (Kim et al. 2005). There are many factors that contribute to a politically relevant 
topic being covered on a nightly news program. The selection criteria that media uses in deciding 
to broadcast an event, influences the saliency of an item, which is important for the public to 
form an opinion. The neutrality of the media is often contested, with certain news programs 
perceived to have more bias than others (Iyengar and Kinder 1989; Watts et al. 1999). Due to the 
nature of the media its influence on public opinion formation is important to investigate. 
News matters for the study of public opinion. Very few people are involved with the day-
to-day chore of creating policy. Newspapers, nightly newscasts, and more recently the Internet 
bring political events to the population at large. Consequently, the news is the main source of 
information about politics for most people (Kim et al. 2005). By choosing what to broadcast on 
the nightly news and what to put above the fold in a newspaper, media influences what 
information the public receives first. Given the near monopoly that today's media outlets have on 
access to information about politics, it is important to consider the role that they play in shaping 
political public opinion. 
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There are two ways that the media can influence voter's opinions about politics, agenda 
setting and priming. News media can tell people what to think about, which is known as agenda 
setting (Iyengar and Kinder 1989). Priming effects by the media influence what comes to mind 
when a citizen evaluates their political choices (Iyengar and Kinder 1989). Using experimental 
techniques they investigate the influence that television news has on public opinion and 
discourse (Iyengar and Kinder 1989). The purpose of their study was ―to establish that television 
news is in fact an educator virtually without peer that shapes the American public's conception of 
political life in pervasive ways; that television news is news that matters‖ (Iyengar and Kinder 
1989, p 2). Americans depend on the mass media for information giving the media incredible 
ability to shape public opinion. The power of TV rests not on the persuasion but rather on the 
ability to set the agenda and prime audiences.  
Agenda setting findings indicate that prominence of a story on the nightly news effects 
evaluations by the public of the most pressing issues of the day (Iyengar and Kinder 1989). 
Television news shapes public priorities, these effects do not immediately disappear either, but 
are lasting. Stories that appear first in a broadcast have strong effects on public opinion. Agenda 
setting by television news has the most influence on those with the least involvement in political 
affairs and political independents; while artisans and activists are influenced little by the media 
(Iyengar and Kinder 1989). 
Priming is defined as ―calling attention to some matters while ignoring others, television 
news influences the standards by which government, presidents, policies, and candidates for 
public office are judged‖ (Iyengar and Kinder 1989, p 63). People only pay attention to a small 
amount of information, they prefer heuristics: intuitive short-cuts and rules of thumb. 
Experiments reveal that priming effects are different for partisans, affecting the out-party most 
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(Iyengar and Kinder 1989).  
Much attention has been paid to the media's ability to influence and shift public opinion. 
Research indicates that statements of news commentators have a strong impact on public opinion 
(Page et al. 1987). The role of news commentators as opinion elites is important to explore given 
their impact on public opinion. The media also influences what is on the national agenda by 
making the public aware of certain issues. Cuing by the media is found have effects on voters‘ 
perceptions, information, attitudes, and even behavior (J. P. Robinson 1976). Contradicting 
research on the importance of the media in shaping public opinion also abounds. Research by 
Weaver, indicates that the media is not likely to teach attitudes or opinions, but can indirectly 
influence voter opinions and evaluations (1996). 
The President and Domestic Public Opinion 
The ability of the president to lead and shape American public opinion is a large area of 
study within public opinion literature. The president is often one of few politicians that most 
Americans can identify (Cohen 2003). One of the most commonly used tools for presidential 
leadership is giving a speech. In order for the president to lead policy, his viewpoint must be 
conveyed to the American people. Segments of the population can be reached by speeches that 
otherwise would not seek out the information on their own. Research indicates that when the 
president gives a speech, if he is able to influence opinion about a specific topic when he pays it 
explicit attention (Cohen and Hamman 2003). This could be due to the follower effect where 
citizens with low political knowledge often become followers, these are people who support the 
presidential policy regardless of the benefits or consequences of the policy for them (J. Mueller 
1973). This follower effect is due in part to informational short cuts, people who support the 
president are likely to support his policy regardless of the policy because they support the 
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president.  
Research indicates that public perceptions of the president within the United States are 
tied to economic, social and international performance of the president (Ostrom and Job 1986).  
Presidents use their approval ratings as political capital to push for their agenda with Congress 
when they are making policy. In order to garner support for a policy the president often turns to 
the public, making speeches intended to influence public opinion. Presidential influence is 
greatest for speeches on foreign policy, and even greater when the president has high approval 
ratings already (Cohen and Hamman 2003). This influence is attributed to the president's role as 
leader. Leaders are often perceived as acting in the self interest of the population due to their 
skills and knowledge of the complexity in the international system when pursuing foreign affairs 
(Russett 1990). Despite the freedom granted to the president they will often consider the 
implications from the public for actions taken in the foreign realm (Russett 1990). Evidence 
supports that the president is capable of leading the public on matters of foreign and domestic 
policy. 
Framing Effects 
Political elites are given the ability to frame events in their speeches in order to garner 
support for their cause. Frames are defined as the way ―a source … defines the essential problem 
underlying a particular social or political issue and outlines a set of considerations purportedly 
relevant to that issue‖ (T. E. Nelson, Oxley, and Clawson 1997). Frames can convince the public 
to support the leader‘s policy prescriptions. Leaders use frames to affect public opinion about 
specific topics during their speeches by paying explicit attention to a topic (Cohen and Hamman 
2003; Druckman 2008). There are many types of frames and framing effects.  
Within psychology, research on framing effects focuses on the cognitive processes. 
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Research within cognitive psychology indicates humans are cognitive misers. It is possible for 
humans to reach their cognitive limits when faced with conflicting information, many 
alternatives, and important decisions (David P. Redlawsk 2004). In order to make sense of the 
information that they receive humans place information into cognitive clusters, or schema. A 
schema gives a structure for understanding new information  (Conover and Feldman 1984). 
These schemas serve as cognitive shortcuts for individuals who are able to categorize new 
information without the hindrance of creating a new schema for every interaction (Lodge and 
Hamill 1986). Schemas are expected to influence how an individual perceives new information 
and selects it for recall (R. Herrmann, Voss, Schooler, and Ciarrochi 1997). Belief systems are 
related to schemas in the sense that belief systems are organized knowledge of the world that 
influences perceptions (O. Holsti 1967). Schemas and belief systems provide a framework that 
an individual uses to interpret the world. Once formed, schemas are resistant to change, often 
people make new information fit their existing schema rather than the schema fit the information 
(Fiske and Taylor 1984). Lack of change in schemas is important in order for schemas to provide 
cognitive short cuts to individuals. 
Schemas serve to simplify reality and shape people‘s perceptions about the world with 
regard to the schema that is activated (Fiske and Taylor 1984). When new information activates a 
schema people fill in the gaps about the situation with their knowledge based on the activated 
schema (Hermann 1986). The process of filling in the gaps enables people to respond to the new 
information by relying on stereotypes. Stereotypes are associated with similar patterns of ideal-
type gestalts (Hermann 2003). Simplicity is again achieved through the use of stereotypes. 
Stereotypes provide a script for individuals to use when confronted with a situation that fits 
within a specific schematic cluster (Hermann 2003). Framing effects occur when schema is 
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activated. Frames are expected to ―shape individual understanding and opinion concerning an 
issues by stressing specific elements or features of the broader controversy, reducing a usually 
complex issue down to one or two central aspects‖ (T. E. Nelson, Clawson, and Oxley 1997, p 
568). By emphasizing specific aspects of a topic, the media plays an important role in shaping 
how people view topics. 
Framing is extensively studied as a tool of the mass media (J. N. Druckman 2008; Gross 
and Brewer 2007; e.g. T. E. Nelson, Clawson, and Oxley 1997; Parker-Stephen and Smidt 2009; 
Reese and Lewis 2009). Framing effects literature focuses on topics such as civil liberties, 
foreign policy, government spending (Jacoby 2000; Mintz and Redd 2003; e.g. T. E. Nelson, 
Clawson, and Oxley 1997). A framing effect is defined in several ways. Scholars define framing 
effects as an effect that occurs ―when, in the course of describing an issue or event, a speaker's 
emphasis on a subset of potentially relevant considerations causes individuals to focus on these 
considerations when constructing their opinions‖ (Druckman 2008, p. 1042). Another definition 
of frames ―is the process by which a communication sources, such as a news organization, 
defines and constructs a political issue or public controversy‖ (T. E. Nelson, Clawson, and Oxley 
1997, p. 567). In essence frames provide organizing principles around which people can form 
their opinions. These organizing points allow the public to weigh options and decide on a 
position, often a difficult task for the public (Zaller and Feldman 1992). The media condenses 
complex information down to smaller segments of information that allow the public to process 
information in a coherent fashion.  
There is a debate within the literature about the different effects of priming and framing 
(Chong and Druckman 2007; Iyengar and Kinder 1989). Framing effects are said to occur when 
logically equivalent wording leads to different conclusions (Druckman 2004). Priming is 
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described as ―changes in the standards that people use to make political evaluations‖ within 
media studies (Iyengar and Kinder 1989, p. 63). There is ample evidence for the effects of 
priming within the literature. Priming as identified within the psychological literature is expected 
to makes a specific schema more accessible (Scheufele and Tewksbury 2007). The debate centers 
on whether there is a difference between priming and framing effects. Chong and Druckman 
contend that the effects attributed to priming and framing can be succumbed into the same 
concept (2007). Others argue that there is a difference between the two concepts which is ―the 
difference between whether we think about an issue and how we feel about it‖ (Scheufele and 
Tewksbury 2007, 14). Frames, according to research in mass communications ―refers to modes 
of presentation that journalists and other communicators use to present information in a way that 
resonates with existing underlying schemas among their audience‖ (Scheufele and Tewksbury 
2007). Priming according to this line of research influences what is salient in peoples minds and 
what the public takes into account when it forms its judgments (Scheufele and Tewksbury 2007).  
Public Opinion and Partisanship 
Membership in a political party is a key predictor of vote choice identified in the 
American literature, but ignored at the level of foreign policy (Bartels 2000). Identification with 
a political party provides voters with a lens in which to view the political environment. Given the 
nature of political parties and vote choice, it is logical to conclude that party identification could 
influence opinion formation. Oddly this aspect of opinion formation has not been studied as 
extensively in political science research. The few studies that have been conducted find that party 
identification does influence attitudes (Belknap and Campbell 1951). Partisan identification 
influences people's perceptions of new material even under conditions requiring neutrality 
(Lodge and Taber 2005). Experimental research indicates that participants use partisan 
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identification to categorize policy statements (Lodge and Hamill 1986). For this reason new 
studies of opinion formation need to include partisanship and party leadership as a source of 
opinion.  
Emotion in Politics 
Emotions are an integral part of the political process. They are important aspects of 
personality that need to be included when studying decision making (Redlawsk et al. 2010).  
Research that focuses on the role of emotions in politics attempts to answer the question of 
whether we think before we feel or feel before we think (e.g. Lodge and Taber 2005; Marcus and 
Mackuen 1993). Responses to events, situations, persons and symbols can all be influenced by 
emotions (Cottam, Dietz-Uhler, Mastors, and Preston 2010). Studies differentiate between affect 
and emotion. Affect is used for evaluation which can include moods and emotions, it can be both 
positive or negative (Cottam et al 2010). Emotions are more defined affective states such as 
anger, hatred, and love (Cottam et al 2010).  
A prominent area of research within the subject of emotions relates to the affect of 
anxiety, threat and enthusiasm (e.g. Huddy et al. 2005; Marcus and Mackuen 1993; Marcus et al. 
2000; Petersen 2010). In this research threat is a motivating factor that increases attention to 
politics and enthusiasm also increases political involvement (Marcus and Mackuen 1993). Threat 
is manifested as anxiety which ―is argued to regulate the behavior and opinions in the face of 
hazards, i.e., everything from terrorist attacks to rising unemployment rates and environmental 
disasters (Petersen 2010). Anxious publics will seek out new information when the environment 
signals that something is not as it should be, this leads them to rely less on heuristics of the 
political system and focus on issues during elections (Marcus and Mackuen 1993; Petersen 
2010). This characterization of anxiety links it to the debate that we feel before we think (Marcus 
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and Mackuen 1993). Research on the effects of fear in campaign advertisements show similar 
results, fear effects political choice and increases the desire to gain more information about 
related stories (Brader 2011).  
Enthusiasm is characterized by the words sympathy, hope, and proud when referring to a  
political candidate is (Marcus and Mackuen 1993). The study of enthusiasm indicates that when 
people feel enthusiastic about a political candidate they are predisposed to vote for that candidate 
despite partisanship (Marcus and Mackuen 1993; Redlawsk et al. 2010). The feeling of 
enthusiasm particularly is important because not only can it affect vote choice and partisanship, 
but it has also has been shown to overcome the latent affects of unease with President Obama's 
race among white voters in the 2008 presidential election (Redlawsk et al. 2010). This is 
particularly important for research on image theory which proposes that people will feel good 
about a policy action that they otherwise would not support without emotional incentive.  
Public Opinion and Foreign Policy  
Most research on public opinion formation focuses on domestic issues, such as social 
welfare policies. While domestic politics is important, people often have more concrete views of 
domestic level issues due to more frequent exposure to the issues. The public has less contact 
with foreign affairs than with domestic politics, making  them arguably more susceptible to 
influence from elites. The few studies of policy congruence between public opinion and actual 
foreign policy indicate that a majority of the time there is an astonishing amount of congruence 
between public opinion and foreign policy, although it is uncertain which occurs first (Monroe 
1998; Miller and Stokes 1963). There is little research into whether political leaders are 
motivated by public opinion within the discipline. This is a byproduct of the Almond-Lippman 
consensus which concluded that on matters of foreign policy the public was uninterested, 
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volatile, and inconsistent. 
Findings indicating that public opinion is congruent with policy challenge early thoughts 
about the role of public opinion in foreign affairs. These early studies of the connection between 
foreign affairs and public opinion focused on the ability of the public to have a consistent attitude 
regarding foreign affairs. Foreign policy occurs outside the immediate location of most of the 
public, requiring them to pay attention to news about foreign affairs to be informed. Direct 
effects of foreign affairs on citizens are hard to identify. Many citizens lose interest when foreign 
affairs are not highly salient. Researchers tracked the volatility of attitudes on foreign affairs 
concluding that they were volatile and that knowledge of foreign policy facts was lacking in 
survey respondents, hampering their ability to form a coherent opinion about foreign policy 
(Almond 1977; Converse 1964). Without background or general knowledge, respondents' 
opinions lacked structure indicating that public opinion was not a good source of foreign policy 
decision making (Converse 1964). Most researchers during, what has been termed by Holsti 
(1992), the Almond-Lippmann consensus era, believed that there was minimal influence of the 
public on matters of foreign policy. This lack of emphasis on public opinion and foreign policy 
was fueled by scholarly focus on realism. Realist theory emphasizes the importance of states' 
interests, defined as power, on foreign policy. Realism also contends that the state is a unitary 
actor, thus not allowing for an influence of public opinion (Morgenthau 1954). In this era all 
politics was expected to stop at the waters edge  Fear that an emotional and unstructured public 
would lead the U.S. in directions dangerous directions if the public led foreign policy decisions 
were eased by evidence that public opinion did little to influence foreign policy. Policy makers 
were free to pursue policy without expecting retributions from the public until a foreign policy 
event became the most important issue (Sobel 2001). Thus, as public opinion did not or could not 
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influence foreign policy except in rare occurrences, there was no need for further research in the 
field.   
Research within Europe assumed a similar vein with regard to Europeans views on 
foreign policy at this time. Political leaders and researchers believed that a permissive consensus 
existed amongst the public about matters relating to the EU (Sinnott 2000). Salience of EU issues 
was low, and consequently the public paid little attention to the matter (R. Eichenberg 1989). 
Publics were not expected to hold strong beliefs about EU policy or attitudes about the directions 
that political leaders should take with regard to the EU.  
Challenges to the Almond-Lippmann consensus arrived with the Vietnam War.  
Opposition to the Vietnam War remained consistent despite research indicating public's lack of 
structure on matters of foreign affairs.  Research challenged that public opinion was a volatile as 
characterized by Almond. Critiques of Converse's work also appeared during this time period. 
Caspary disagreed with Almond's conclusion that the public's lack of attention to foreign affairs 
would produce volatile opinions (1970).  By investigating more questions than the single 
question used in Almond's analysis, he found that public opinion is not volatile, but rather that 
public opinion operates in a ―permissive mood‖ (Caspary 1970).  The permissive mood allows 
policy makers to conduct policy as if they had a ―blank check for foreign policy adventures‖ 
(Caspary 1970).  This mood although permissive, is not as unstable as previously indicated.  
Drawing from research about opinion change, public opinion was found to respond in rational 
ways to the international environment (Shapiro and Page 1988). Public opinion was no longer 
viewed as volatile and emotional. Research in Europe reflected this shift away from viewing 
public opinion as unimportant for policy makers.   
This research is further corroborated from research within Europe indicating that public 
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opinion responds to events (R. Eichenberg and R. Dalton 1993). Changes in public opinion can 
be linked to international events, not to a volatile mood swing of the masses. This change was 
brought on by three events, the Vietnam War, SALT I agreements, and the decrease in salience of 
security issues (Eichenberg 1989). Research indicated that public opinion was subject to political 
events, but that it fluctuated in a predictable manner with changes in the foreign policy 
environment (R. Dalton and Duval 1986). Higher perceptions of Soviet threat are related with 
higher levels of support for defense spending and political events (Eichenberg 1989). Even 
attitudes and evaluations of the EU itself were linked to political events (Eichenberg and Dalton 
1993). These studies indicated that not only did public opinion matter for foreign policy 
formation but that it was worthy of consulting and leading.  
Research into ideological structures guiding foreign policy attitudes has indicated that the 
concept of a bi-polar structure may be too simplistic (Holsti 1992). Trying to fit people's 
opinions into either an isolationist or interventionist perspective will not work if people do not 
think in such a black and white manner. Citizens use heuristics, information shortcuts, to 
organize their views of foreign policy matters (Hurwitz and Peffley 1987).  These heuristics 
serve to guide citizens on foreign policy matters without the need to be informed (Hurwitz and 
Peffley 1987). Heuristics help answer questions about the ability of the public to have a coherent 
opinion while also lacking information about a topic. 
After the challenges to the Almond-Lippmann consensus, research about the role of 
public opinion in foreign policy flourished. Now that the public was no longer problematic for 
political elites to follow, researchers looked for evidence that there was a connection between 
public opinion and foreign policy. Studies indicate that there is congruence between public 
opinion and foreign affairs.  Researchers found that within democratic systems, public opinion 
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―shapes and constrains national security policy‖ in a variety of ways (Russett 1990). Studies 
testing for policy congruence found high levels of congruence between policy and public opinion 
(e.g. Monroe 1998; Page and Shapiro 1983). Eichenberg found evidence that public opinion 
influenced the policies of NATO and increases in defense spending (1989). Public opinion is an 
important consideration for political leaders. 
Studies have found high levels of congruence between public opinion and foreign policy, 
but lack clear evidence about who was leading whom (Page and Shapiro 1983).  Monroe finds a 
drop in congruence from earlier studies in his analysis, but that foreign policy related issues 
always had above average consistency possibly due to the effect of presidential leadership and 
the public's role of retroactive approval on these matters (1998). 
Sources of Public Opinion and Foreign Policy 
Public opinion matters to policy makers. Policy makers have been shown to respond to 
public opinion on specific issues (e.g. Eichenberg and Dalton 1993). If policy makers respond to 
public opinion is it important to understand where the public gets its opinion (Dahl 1989). 
Knowledge of foreign affairs is limited in the public; therefore, political leaders provide 
information about international events to the public. Studies of policy congruence between 
political elites and public opinion shows that foreign policy issues have higher levels of 
congruence (Page and Shapiro 1983). It is important to understand the sources of public opinion. 
Media and Foreign Policy 
Media influence is noted as an influence on public opinion of foreign affairs (e.g. Reese 
and Lewis 2009). The media has power to influence public opinion on matters of domestic 
affairs, does this power carry over to the realm of foreign affairs? For most citizens most of the 
time, foreign policy is far removed from their daily lives. Foreign policy decisions do not 
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directly influence their daily lives and they are reliant on other sources for information about 
foreign affairs (Russett 1990). For this reason the media's presentation of the information is 
important. Prime time presidential speeches on matters of foreign policy are often followed by a 
rise in presidential approval ratings (Russett 1990). 
There is little research that looks at the role of the media in shaping public opinion on 
foreign policy in isolation. Most of the research acknowledges that the media and political elites 
cannot influence the public in isolation, these two groups are interconnected (Baum and Potter 
2008). The media is mostly treated as an intervening variable between elite leadership and public 
opinion (e.g. Jentleson 1992). The media is shown to have effects on views about foreign policy 
by broadcasting presidential speeches and commentators, but causality has not been effectively 
shown (Jordan and Page 1992). 
The CNN effect is considered the media's ability to co-opt the governments ability to 
create foreign policy (Livingston and Eachus 1995). The media is able to do this through intense 
focus on specific issues of foreign affairs (Western 2002). This research often looks at the CNN 
effect in the decision to intervene in a humanitarian crisis. The focus by the media on 
humanitarian crises shapes public opinion about a the need for intervention, which in turn puts 
pressures on policy makers (Soderlund 2008). The amount of attention that journalists pay to 
humanitarian crises will determine whether the state intervenes. The CNN effect while pervasive 
has been proven to be indeterminate (Mermin 1997; P. Robinson 1999; Soderlund 2008). One of 
the crucial critiques of the CNN effect is that it does not address questions regarding who 
controls the media (Robinson 1999). Government leadership of the media may actually be the 
driving factor (Western 2002).  
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Elite Leadership and Foreign Policy 
The ability of the leader to influence public opinion is another area that is studied (e.g. 
Foyle 2004). Research conducted in the U.S. predominantly focuses on the role of the president 
in shaping public opinion. Despite the freedoms granted to the president in the role of 
formulating foreign policy, evidence suggests that the president does consider public opinion 
when creating policy (Russett 1990). With regard to the Iraq War in 2003, President Bush 
indicated that public approval was necessary before operations could commence, although he did 
contend that public opinion should not be the only consideration in policy making (Foyle 2004). 
Awareness of public opinion and attempts to shape it by President Bush highlight the importance 
of public opinion for successful foreign policy endeavors. 
In the context of American foreign policy, there are examples of presidential framing of 
topics with mixed success (e.g. Mintz and Redd 2003). By framing topics in a specific light, 
political leaders can invoke images with strong emotional connections for the public. One of the 
areas that the president is given leeway to shape public opinion is during an international crises 
culminating in a rally round the flag effect (Baum and Potter 2007).  
The rally 'round-the-flag literature begins with Mueller's work, War, Presidents, and 
Public Opinion (1973).  Mueller defines a rally effect as ―being associated with an event which 
(1) is international and (2) involves the United States and particularly the president directly; and 
it must be (3) specific, dramatic, and sharply focused‖ (Mueller 1973). Rally events must be 
international because it must be associated with an event that creates unity within the nation 
rather than division. Increases in presidential approval are the indicators of a rally event; 
therefore, the event must directly relate to the U.S. and the president to be relevant to the 
populace. The public may not notice slight, gradual change in the international environment, but 
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a dramatic event ensures that the attention of the public is captured and focused on the event long 
enough for the public to form an opinion.   
Followers are members of the public that follow presidential leadership; whereas 
partisans follow party leadership. Due to levels of uncertainty there are large segments of the 
population that support the president's policy regardless, they are called followers (Mueller 
1973). The U.S. president has the sole responsibility of Head of State which strengthens his 
follower effect. Among followers, the president leads public opinion about policies due to his 
role of leader of the country. Where the role is less clear there may be less of an ability for 
presidential leadership. International crisis events provide a clear role for presidential leadership 
in an area with high levels of uncertainty. This follower effect gives presidents more flexibility to 
create/shape foreign policy in the short term (Mueller 1973). ―When Presidential war policy 
shifted...swarms of followers have obligingly accepted the Presidents lead‖ (Mueller 1973).  
President have the capability to lead large segments of the population to support their policy by 
virtue of being the president. The follower effect may be more prominent in the area of foreign 
policy due to the uncertain nature of the environment. 
Partisanship and Foreign Policy  
Partisanship is an understudied variable in studies of public opinion formation. As 
characterized above the study of  media and presidential influence on public opinion within the 
American case has been extensively researched. Scholars attribute this lack of attention to a lack 
of difference between parties on foreign policy issues. Recently this notion has been challenged. 
There is increasing evidence within the literature that even in America, parties have differing 
views on foreign policy. Party can serve as a cognitive shortcut for individuals who are 
uninformed about foreign policy (Rahn 1993). Party provides a schema that allows the public to 
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recall information that fits into their schema better than information that is inconsistent (Lodge 
and Hamill 1986). Scholars as early as Mueller have noted that partisanship is an important 
predictor in the speed of approval decrease for the president after a rally event, but parties 
continue to be ignored in the literature on public opinion formation (1973). 
The literature suggests that American partisans take cues from party elites about foreign 
affairs (Belknap and Campbell 1951; Mueller 1971). Political elites are not limited to the 
governing officials or media elites. Elites can also be compromised of members of a persons 
political party. Party cues can effect support for foreign policy and evaluations about the 
truthfulness of information regarding foreign policy (Haider-Markel and Joslyn 2009).  
Partisan effects have also been noted in support/approval of the president following a 
rally event (Hetherington and Nelson 2003). After a rally point decreases in the president's 
popularity are slowest for members of the president's party and quickest for members of the 
opposition party. Independents decrease presidential support in between the results for the other 
two parties (Mueller 1973). Partisanship is important because people use party position as a cue 
to form their preferences when parties offer different view points. Partisanship effects tend to 
increase with the duration of the conflict (Mueller 1973). ―Much of the public's response to the 
wars [Korea and Vietnam] has been influenced by the position taken by the leadership of the 
political parties‖ (Mueller 1973). Party cues are therefore important to the study of shaping 
foreign policy public opinion even during a crisis situation. 
Emotion in Politics and Foreign Policy 
Emotions are under explored area of foreign policy opinion formation. Few studies 
incorporate emotions into their analysis of the opinion policy nexus. Often studies that include 
emotion, do not directly address the public opinion formation process (Geva and Skorick 1999; 
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Mintz and Redd 2003). Emotions are an integral part of the decision making process (as quoted 
earlier). Crisis events are often emotionally charged. To better understand public opinion 
formation of foreign policy the role of emotions must be considered.  
One area of research that acknowledges the role of emotions, is the literature on the rally-
'round-the-flag effect and the literature on the body bag effect (e.g. Baker and Oneal 2001; 
Gartner 2008). The rally effect is commonly defined as ―the sudden and substantial increase in 
public approval of the president that occurs in response to certain kinds of dramatic international 
events‖ (Hetherington and Nelson 2003).  The rally 'round the flag effect is the short-lived 
emotional response in public opinion towards the president after a foreign policy action (Russett 
1990). The action is not restricted to the use of force as commonly perceived, but can be any 
foreign policy action taken by the president (Russett 1990). As with most aspects of foreign 
policy, the rally effect has predominantly been studied in the U.S. Recently, scholars have looked 
at countries other than the U.S. to see if there is evidence that the phenomenon occurs in 
countries other than the U.S. (Lai and Reiter 2005). This study addresses this question, does the 
rally effect occur outside the U.S. and can it be used to shape public opinion.  Presidential 
approval rating increases from a rally event are short term effects, expected to fade when the 
event becomes less salient.  Presidential popularity declines over time as a general rule, rally 
points provide ―short term bumps and wiggles‖ in this pattern (Mueller 1973).    
Does Europe Differ 
The leadership role of the president on foreign policy matters within the U.S. is generally 
accepted. The president is both the head of state and the head of government.  His official role as 
commander in chief of the military has been used by presidents to establish his supremacy in 
foreign affairs. Presidents are responsible for communicating their policies to both the public and 
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politicians. By going public, presidents attempt to use their position of leader to persuade both 
the public and politicians to back their policies. Presidents can hold televised press conferences 
followed by questions to communicate their policies and views. The president is required to give 
a State of the Union address to Congress once a year, where he can propose new policy areas for 
Congress to consider. During times of uncertainty the president often uses the media as a tool to 
show that he is aware of the problem and that he is working towards a solution. Often the 
president is followed by media commentators who not only dissect what the president said and 
how, but offer counter points to the president's speech. Throughout this process his methods may 
be questioned but not his authority of leader of the American government.   
Parliamentary systems differ dramatically from presidential systems. In parliamentary 
systems the head of government is the Prime Minister who is selected from the members of 
parliament, typically he or she is the leader of the majority party. The prime minister is a member 
of parliament and the authority to govern resides in support from the parliament. Party loyalty, 
within the legislature, is strong in parliamentary systems, due to their importance in the 
formation of government. The party is also vital in the election of members to parliament. Party 
support means financial assistance, endorsement by the party and use of the party brand. In 
closed list electoral systems voters do not vote for a candidate, rather they vote for a party to 
represent them in the legislature. Loyalty to the party and the party's political platform is 
rewarded under parliamentary systems, whereas being a maverick and opposing the party are 
punished. Bipartisan support for legislation is difficult to get in parliamentary systems.   
Parliamentary systems can have minority governments, coalition governments or majority 
governments. In majority governments, one party receives a majority of seats in parliament, 
allowing it to form a government without the support of other parties. This type of government is 
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the predominant form in the United Kingdom. Majority governments do not need to include 
members of other parties in the assignment of ministry positions. The power within a majority 
government to enact legislation and determine policy is the most similar to the U.S. presidential 
system.  
Coalition governments are drastically different from the type of government found in the 
U.S. Coalition governments are the result of no party in the legislature receiving a majority of the 
vote. Proportional electoral systems, where parties are awarded seats in the legislature based on 
the percentage of the vote received in each district, often result in coalition governments. When 
no party receives a majority of seats, the parties in the legislature must negotiate to form a 
government between two or more parties. The government can be formed along ideological 
boundaries or policy initiatives. The larger party in the resulting coalition typically receives the 
premiership, the other ministries are allocated amongst the coalition members as agreed to during 
the bargaining process. Coalition governments allow smaller parties to play a larger role in 
creating legislation than would occur in majority governments. Stability of the government 
resides with the stability of the coalition partners and their ability to work together. In coalition 
governments there is a larger number of veto players involved in crating policy. The ability of the 
prime minster to lead the country can be questioned because he or she does not represent a 
majority of the country directly.   
Europe also has two other types of governments that should be considered for public 
opinion formation. Several governments maintain a hereditary head of state. In constitutional 
monarchies there is loyalty to the monarchy that transcends party politics. The official role of the 
monarch varies across countries as does the leadership ability of the monarch. Monarchs may not 
be involved in the day to day affairs of government, but when and if they express their views it is 
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libel to resonate with the public.   
Semi-presidential systems are another important government type to consider. The power 
to lead policy and the public is split between a prime minister and president in these systems.  
After the fall of the Soviet Union many former Communist countries adopted semi-presidential 
systems. The role of the leaders and their authority varies across countries.  In France the 
president is the stronger of the two. The French president is popularly elected by a majority of 
the population and then appoints the prime minister and other ministry officials. The French 
president must appoint the ministry along the political make up of the parliament; however, he 
can force the prime minister to resign. Under the French system the president is the head of state 
and the prime minister is head of the government. This clear distinction mandates foreign policy 
to the president and domestic policy to the prime minister under conditions of cohabitation, when 
the president and prime minister belong to different parties.   
In Poland, another European semi-presidential system, the president is popularly elected, 
serves as the head of state and has little power over legislation. The prime minister is selected to 
run the government from the legislature similar to the procedure in parliamentary systems.  
Leadership of public opinion in Poland is not automatically dominated by either the president or 
the prime minister. Public opinion leadership in semi-presidential systems inherently differs from 
the other forms of government given the dual executive. 
The European Union (EU) originally established as an economic union to balance U.S. 
power has grown in influence and policy areas over the years. Policy areas now covered by the 
EU include economic, social, domestic and to a degree foreign. The EU is organized around the 
concept of three pillars, the community, the common foreign and security policy, and cooperation 
in police and judicial matters (Europa - The EU at a Glance 2009). These three pillars are not 
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equally integrated, but the EU is striving for complete integration as soon as possible. EU policy 
increasingly influences the policies that governments can pursue unilaterally. The competing 
philosophies about the structure of the EU, federal system or supranational organization, have 
not been resolved. Despite the inclusion of a common foreign and security policy as the second 
pillar within the EU, national governments continue to pursue differing foreign and security 
policies. 
Given the differing governmental systems and actors it is important to ensure that theories 
developed in America can be applied to Europe. Within Europe there are many different types of 
governments which give the leader of the country different levels of prominence. In countries 
with a dual executive the persuasive abilities of the leader will likely vary considerably when the 
leaders belong to opposing groups. The ability to invoke the ally or enemy image may be 
considerably less for the opposition party leader as opposed to the Prime Minister. The 
importance of parties differs in Europe than in the U.S.  Party is an important consideration when 
predicting the leadership ability of political elites within Europe. The role of the EU cannot be 
ignored when considering public opinion formation on foreign and security policy in the event of 
a crisis situation. The EU continues to strengthen its influence in this area restricting the possible 
policy outcomes each member-state can pursue independent of the EU. For this reason it is 
important to study how and if these structures affect public opinion formation differently than in 
the U.S. before explaining public opinion with American theories.   
Public Opinion and Foreign Policy in Europe 
Public opinion studies of European countries tend to focus on how people form their 
opinions about European integration. European integration is a highly important issues within the 
EU and prospective member-states. Despite the attention given to the topic of European 
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integration in the literature there are still a relatively small number of studies before the fall of 
the Soviet Union. With regards to unification and integration of the EU, policy makers believed 
that there was a permissive consensus within the populace. The masses had no clear opinion on 
matters of EU integration because it operated outside of their direct knowledge. This notion was 
directly challenged multiple times in the 1990s beginning with the Danish rejection of the 
Maastricht treaty (Worre 1995). Researchers indicated that salience was a crucial predictor of the 
impact of public opinion on policy (Oppermann and Viehrig 2009). 
The EU constitution was designed to further the process of integration amongst member 
states. When the constitution was rejected by the French and Dutch there was speculation that 
further EU integration would cease (Sbragia 2006). The constitution was designed to deepen the 
ties between the member states, but was surprisingly rejected by two of the six founding member 
states (Sbragia 2006). This is further evidence that the permissive consensus theory of public 
opinion is false. The failure of the constitution to pass referendum in key member states accents 
the need for an understanding of the role of public opinion in the EU integration process.   
Elites in Europe had formally operated with the same understanding of American elites 
that public opinion was erratic and not worthy of consultation before policy implementation. 
Research indicated that public opinion was subject to political events, but that it fluctuated in a 
predictable manner with changes in the foreign policy environment (Dalton and Duval 1986).  
Threat perception was linked with support for increased defense spending (Eichenberg 1989).  
Even attitudes and evaluations of the EU itself were linked to political events (Eichenberg and 
Dalton 1993). These studies indicated that not only did public opinion matter for foreign policy 
formation but that it was worthy of consulting and leading.  
One of the earliest studies of the implications of public opinion on foreign policy among 
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EU countries, is Eichenberg's book which focused on the role of public opinion in shaping 
national security policies (1989). During the 1980s, public opinion within European countries 
became a highly salient issue (Eichenberg 1989). Most early studies of public opinion's 
interaction with security policy reflected that public opinion followed the opinion of political 
elites. During the 1980s scholars noted that a change in the importance of public opinion had 
taken place. Eichenberg found evidence that public opinion influenced the policies of NATO and 
increases in defense spending (1989).   
Public Opinion and Integration Within the European Union 
Early research into public opinion and attitudes about EU integration focused on the 
economic incentives literature. This research posited that citizens' evaluation of the EU was 
based on their relative  economic gains and losses at the hands of the EU.  According to this 
explanation citizens in countries that received financial assistance from the EU would have better 
evaluations of EU membership ―as a good thing‖, over citizens who felt that their country was 
paying more than receiving (Eichenberg and Dalton 2007). Using early Eurobarometer surveys 
these researchers found evidence to support the economic calculus model for assessing EU 
membership.   
One of the first instances challenging the permissive consensus involved the Dutch vote 
on the Maastrict treaty. Within Denmark the negotiations and ratifications of the Maastricht 
Treaty became a highly salient issues amongst the Danish public. Danes viewed the Maastricht 
treaty as a question of what model should the EU become, federal or intergovernmental, with 
Danes heavily favoring the national right to veto (Worre 1995). The original referendum on the 
Maastricht Treaty did not pass in Denmark because many Danes feared that it would lead toward 
a federal EU and loss of Danish sovereignty on key issues such as ―welfare and taxes, and 
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defense and foreign affairs‖ (Worre 1995).   
National identity theories were offered to counter explanations given by the economic 
calculus theory of opinion towards EU integration. This line of research investigated the effect of 
national identities on support for EU integration (Hooghe and Marks 2004). According to this 
research identity is an important concept when evaluating policy, ideas that conflict with a 
person's identity will be viewed in a more negative light than policy that has no effect on their 
identity or strengthens their identity. Person's who viewed themselves as Europeans first, were 
expected to have positive feelings about further EU integration (McLaren 2004). Attachment to a 
national identity first was expected to have the opposite effect, antagonism towards further EU 
integration. In times of crisis, higher levels of threat perception, increase xenophobic attitudes an 
animosity (Huddy et al. 2005). Preference for a national identify over a European identity is not 
automatic (Hooghe and Marks 2007). 
European Union, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy 
Foreign and security policy has become a highly salient issue within the EU.  Security is 
traditionally the role of the national government, but integration within the EU has challenged 
this concept. Terrorism has brought the issue of security to the EU policy agenda.  This section 
will discuss how member states are reacting to security threats in light of EU integration.  This 
section will explore the predicted relationship between EU integration and security policy. 
There are two competing models of the EU both within scholarly literature and the 
political arena.  According to the intergovernmental organization model, the EU should be no 
more ―than co-operation between sovereign states‖ (Thomassen and Schmitt 1997). The federal 
model emphasizes that the EU should become a supranational government which ―is directly 
responsible to the people of Europe and not national governments‖ (Thomassen and Schmitt 
 
32 
 
1997). These two models conflict over where security issues should lie within Europe.  The 
federal model is described as the United States of Europe with European states becoming 
subordinate to the EU similar to states within the United States of America (Cross 2007).  
According to the intergovernmental organization model, security is an extension of sovereignty, 
which is an exclusive right of each member state and its participation within the EU is contingent 
upon the states agreement with EU policy.   
In practice, neither of these models exists, but the ideas persist and effect policy 
formation and the attention that leaders pay towards public opinion. EU integration continues to 
challenge ideas of national sovereignty for countries as the EU attempts to deepen the ties of the 
member states. EU policy was originally formed in what has been termed a ―permissive 
consensus‖ because of its elite driven nature. Foreign policy issues are often classified this way 
because the public has little knowledge of these issues except through elites. This theory has 
been challenged, and overturned in recent years.   
Security integration has posed a difficult challenge for the EU.  The issue of security has 
become a top priority of the EU after September 11, but sovereignty issues keep security policy 
from integrating at levels similar among domestic policies (Cross 2007). Attention to the issue of 
terrorism and security policy exemplifies the role of sovereignty in the formation of policy at the 
EU level and public approval of EU integration. To have a common security policy with respect 
to terrorism requires member states of the EU to cooperate and share information, which is 
antithetical to the nature of states (Duke 2002). Member states do not wish to become 
subordinate to the EU as a federal entity.   
Due to the nature of terrorism, the EU was given an incentive to further integrate security 
policies (Cross 2007). An area where this effect is studied in the literature is security technology 
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integration, which includes security against cyber attack and surveillance and monitoring for 
weapons of mass destruction (Cross 2007). Security technology is further integrated than many 
other aspects of security policy because there is a smaller threat to sovereignty in the type of 
technology used, than in EU mandates requiring states to adopt specific laws (Cross 2007).  
Questions regarding the right to have the final say on foreign policy and national security 
issues among EU member states differ based on the model of the EU that is invoked. Two of the 
arguments put forward that stress the EU's role in security policy are that security threats to EU 
countries predominately originate outside of the EU and that the presence of the EU, prevents 
war from breaking out within the community; therefore, they should have a large say in the 
security policy of the region (Cottey 2006). The Common Security & Foreign Policy (CFSP) 
implemented by the EU essentially has an important role in the security policy of the region; 
however, realization of the goals of the CFSP are rare and often susceptible to relapse (Cottey 
2006). An example of the failure for the CFSP to be fully implemented are the events at the focus 
of this study, the response to September 11, 2001 (Duke 2002). After the events of September 11, 
2001 most European states responded at the national level, despite the existence of the CFSP.  
Responses to terrorism continue to be implemented predominately at the national level rather 
than the regional or EU level. Nation-states desire to retain control over their security policies is 
a primary reason for the failure of the CFSP (Cottey 2006).   
Partisanship in the European Union and Foreign Policy 
Unlike the literature on public opinion formation focused on the U.S., literature focused 
on the EU acknowledges the role that partisanship plays in providing cues to the public. Within 
European public's security policy is often polarized along party lines, often left/right; therefore, it 
is possible that defense policies are replicated along the left/right dimension (Eichenberg 1989).  
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European parties ―show a strong pattern of partisan alignment on defense spending‖ (Eichenberg 
1989). Party elites act as ―cue givers‖ to the party faithful when there are defense issues needing 
attention. To jump from the notion that parties cue their members about preferences on defense 
spending to parties cuing members on other matters of defense is not difficult.  ―The answer must 
be sought in a basic hypothesis from the field of comparative politics: given that citizens look for 
―cues‖ on complicated issues of public policy, the polarization of views is likely to reflect the 
choices available in the party system and the incentives to party competition defined by the 
electoral system  (Eichenberg 1989).  
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Chapter III: Image Theory 
Image theory within political psychology can be used to provide a framework for 
understanding how framing effects work. The lack of a theory of framing effects hinders research 
into the ability of leaders to invoke successful frames to shape public opinion. Applying image 
theory with its more detailed categorization of images and expected responses on the public can 
increase support for previous findings. Images invoked by a leader during a speech serve as the 
frame that a leader gives the target nation. These images are expected to resonate with the public 
and influence their perception of the target nation.  
Research within cognitive psychology indicates humans are cognitive misers. Humans 
are incapable of taking in all of the information that they are constantly bombarded with in daily 
life. In order to make sense of the information that they receive humans place information into 
cognitive clusters, or schema. Schema function as scripts for individuals, they give a structure for 
understanding new information. These schemas serve as cognitive shortcuts for individuals who 
are able to categorize new information without the hindrance of creating a new schema for every 
interaction. Schemas are expected to influence how an individual perceives new information and 
selects it for recall (R. Herrmann, Voss, Schooler, and Ciarrochi 1997). Belief systems are related 
to schemas in the sense that belief systems are organized knowledge of the world that influences 
perceptions (Holsti 1967) . Schemas and belief systems provide a framework that an individual 
uses to interpret the world. Once formed, schemas are resistant to change, often people make 
new information fit their existing schema rather than the schema fit the information (Fiske and 
Taylor 1984). Lack of change in schemas is important in order for schemas to provide cognitive 
short cuts to individuals.  
Schemas serve to simplify reality and shape people‘s perceptions about the world with regard to 
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the schema that is activated (Fiske and Taylor 1984). When new information activates a schema 
people fill in the gaps about the situation with their knowledge based on the activated schema 
(Hermann 1986). The process of filling in the gaps enables people to respond to the new 
information by relying on stereotypes. Stereotypes are associated with similar patterns of ideal-
type gestalts (Hermann 2003). Simplicity is again achieved through the use of stereotypes. 
Stereotypes provide a script for individuals to use when confronted with a situation that fits 
within a specific schematic cluster (Hermann 2003). During times of perceived threat or crisis 
the degree of stereotyping may be more pronounced (Hermann 1986). It is important to note that 
crisis events may induce people to be more prone to use cognitive shortcuts, when processing 
information. This aspect of schema is particularly important for image theory. 
 Applying notions of schema from cognitive psychology image theory defines specific 
ideal-types that can be categorized when applied to foreign policy (Herrmann et al. 1997). Image 
theory is then able to relate decision makers‘ beliefs to policy actions (O‘Reilly 2007). A key 
component of image theory is that policy actions should be determined by the perception of a 
country within a specified image. Or rather that, actions must balance with perceptions. This 
balance is important for the validity of image theory because its premise rests on the assumption 
that a person will react to a specific image in the stereotypical manner given its insights from 
cognitive psychology. 
Image theorists incorporate information about affect and emotion in the research. Affect 
and emotion are expected to influence the cognitive process which is the basis for image theory. 
Emotional responses from an image type used to evaluate a target are expected to ―balance with 
the emotional affective sentiment the subject feels toward the observed target‖ (Herrmann et al. 
1997). Image theory postulates that specific emotional responses are closely tied with certain 
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image types (Cottam et al. 2010). The emotional response that a person feels from an image 
should indicate a specific policy outcome (Herrmann et al. 1997). The policy outcome should 
balance with the emotional response and their perception of image type of the target nation 
(O'Reilly 2007). Political leaders who wish to manipulate public opinion, could use specific 
images to elicit emotional responses from the public manipulating the public‘s perception of the 
target country or policy.  
Previous research about leaders‘ use of speeches to influence public opinion rarely 
investigates the relationship between emotional responses to the speech and opinion. Rally 
‗round the flag research is an exception, basing some of the explanations for surges in approval 
after a crisis to pride and patriotism (i.e. Baker and Oneal 2001). The role of emotions in public 
opinion formation should be studied in a more substantive and systematic way to discover how 
emotion and affect relate to policy choice. Research that focuses on regime type perception 
would benefit from the incorporation of emotion to fully understand the process that creates 
attitudes towards regime types. Current research assumes that there is a connection between 
perceptions of regime types and public approval but does not investigate the process that create 
the connection (i.e. Geva and Hanson 1999). Image theory provides the crucial connection 
bringing emotions back into the study of public opinion formation.  
Image theory relates the cognitive shortcuts people use in daily life to seven image types 
often invoked in international relations. Image types are created based on information about a 
country‘s capabilities, perceptions of threat, and culture and sophistication (O'Reilly 2007). 
Cultural aspects are important to image theory because norms are culturally defined and are 
expected to act as a constraint on policy choice (Herrmann et al. 1997). The seven image types 
are: Enemy, Barbarian, Imperialist, Colonial, Degenerate, Rogue, and Ally.  
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Image Types 
Of the seven image types the rogue image is the most recent addition (O'Reilly 2007). 
The rogue image was added to characterize the threats of an out-law regime seeking to acquire 
weapons of mass destruction (O'Reilly 2007). These types of states have values that are 
inconsistent with the international order, they are aggressive and irrational, have a strong belief 
in their own superiority, and are governed by a small number of elites (Cottam et al. 2010). 
Threat from a rogue country is expected to be moderate to low given its extreme inferiority. 
The enemy image is the most well-known image type. Characterized as a an equal in both 
culture and capabilities the enemy image invokes strong negative affect and emotion coupled 
with intense perceived threat (Cottam et al. 2010). Most research within image theory focuses on 
the enemy image. The ally image is the opposite of the enemy image. The ally is perceived to be 
culturally and capably equal but has good intentions (Cottam et al. 2010). Allies are expected to 
pursue mutually beneficial goals due to similar values and motivations (Cottam et al. 2010). 
Emotional responses to the ally image are expected to be positive. 
Barbarian images are used to describe countries that are perceived to be capably superior 
to one‘s, but culturally inferior. Emotional responses to the barbarian image include disgust, 
anger and fear (Cottam et al. 2010). Use of the barbarian image is more common historically, 
although the Israeli perceptions of Arab states are a possible contemporary example (Cottam et 
al. 2010). Similar to the barbarian image is the degenerate image. The degenerate is characterized 
by an inability of the leadership to make a decision (Herrmann et al. 1997). Degenerate countries 
have strong power capabilities but may not be able to use them given their leadership constraints 
(Herrmann et al. 1997). Degenerate countries often pose high threats because of their 
unpredictable nature.   
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The imperial image describes a country that is superior to one‘s own both culturally and 
capably its motivations include exploiting its colonies (Cottam et al. 2010). The colony image is 
the opposite of the imperial image. This image is used to describe countries where there is an 
opportunity for an imperial country to come in and take over. The colony image is culturally and 
capably inferior to one‘s own country often characterized as childlike (Cottam et al. 2010). 
Emotional responses to the colony image and imperial image both depend on the relationship 
between the perceiver and the target country.   
 Different cultures may respond to the various image types in different ways. Given that 
perceptions are important indicators of which image type a country belongs in, it is important to 
investigate the role of images in a variety of countries. Not only may the countries that fit within 
each image change, but different countries may be able to recognize different image types more 
readily than others. Evidence of this fact comes from experimental designs testing the validity of 
image constructs; their findings indicated that American students were least able to identify the 
colony and degenerate image (Herrmann et al. 1997). Students that have more familiarity with 
these image types may have been better able to categorize their characteristics.  
This aspect is also important for research on the use of images to manipulate public 
opinion. Each country has different norms that may affect a leader‘s ability to manipulate public 
opinion in favor of their policy. Cultural norms may also dictate what it is acceptable to for a 
political leader to say in speech; thereby, constraining their ability to invoke specific images. 
According to cognitive psychology, familiarity with a category, or in this case image, is 
indicative of its future applicability (Cottam 1985). If a leader desires to shape public opinion, he 
must chose an image that will resonate with his or her public. Effective images will be images 
that do not challenge a person‘s preexisting perceptions, as beliefs systems are often difficult and 
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resistant to change (Holsti 1967). 
Research indicates that the enemy, ally, and colony image operate as schema during 
experimental tests post-Cold War (Herrmann et al. 1997). In this way, it is understandable that 
the most successful frames for U.S. presidents have been frames that correspond with regime 
type and enemy images (Mintz and Redd 2003). Regimes that are depicted as enemies and non-
democratic invoke a stronger response from the public when they break international norms 
(Geva and Skorick 1999). Consistency in image and action are important for image effects to 
take root in public opinion (Geva and Skorick 1999). Invoking the name of a non-democratic 
leader also triggers a stronger response from survey respondents (Borrelli and Lockerbie 2008). 
These indicate that once an enemy image is invoked against a target country, there is a stronger 
negative response to the country (Geva and Hanson 1999). Leaders can then invoke specific 
images when speaking about target countries to influence public opinion. Once the cognitive 
shortcuts exist in the public, evidence suggests that support for a policy can be influenced by 
manipulating images within speeches by political leaders.  
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Chapter IV: A Theory of Public Opinion and Images 
A theory of public opinion formation incorporating insights from image theory would 
benefit both fields of inquiry. Literature on public opinion lacks clear cognitive mechanisms that 
connect opinion change with leaders‘ speeches. Image theory can provide this mechanism. 
Research that investigates the relationship between leaders speeches and public opinion often 
looks at differences in survey results after a speech or policy congruence with public opinion 
(e.g.Shapiro and Page 1988; Cohen and Hamman 2003). This research is valuable, but cannot 
accurately assess if the speech was the source of any opinion change.  
Political communication is analyzed in various ways to deduce the implied effects on 
public opinion. Literature on framing effects is most common. This type of research often 
evaluates how an event can be framed, or characterized, to achieve the desired response from the 
public. Prospect theory has benefited from this literature immensely, showing that there are 
different preferences in the public based on whether information is presented in the frame of 
gains or losses (e.g. Boettcher and Cobb 2009; Dunegan 1993).  
Without a theoretical framework, it is difficult to assess whether frames that scholars 
detect in speeches are actually present and resonating with the public. Within foreign policy 
research there is an indication that successful frames create an ―us‖ vs. ―them‖ mentality and 
portray target nations as non-democratic (Mintz and Redd 2003). Threat and motive are 
important aspects of research on framing effects (e.g. Borrelli and Lockerbie 2008; Mintz and 
Redd 2003). Discourse analysis also uses similar themes to create a story from presidential 
speeches that is used to shape public opinion (Loseke 2009). Discourse analysis benefits from 
the addition of emotion to the research, but struggles with causally linking opinion shifts.  
This is indicative of the need for a more thorough theory to assess the ability of elite 
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communication to influence public opinion. Image theory can be used to assess a leaders ability 
to influence public opinion. Image theory is a process based theory that can connect elite 
communication with affective responses in the public that shift their opinion. Speeches where a 
political leader invokes a specific image type should produce expected changes in public 
opinion. These changes would relate to the image invoked and the emotional responses felt 
within the public. The tie to emotion is important in showing that the leader was able to influence 
public opinion. This is an improvement over literature that uses framing effects because there is 
clear categorization of what each ideal-type image should describe and how it should effect 
public perceptions.  
Details of Image Types 
There are seven different image types that are currently discussed in the literature. These 
ideal image types vary based on the three areas of assessment, capabilities, threat, and culture. As 
previously mentioned, capabilities are assessed to understand the policy outcomes ascribed to 
each image type (Herrmann, et al 1997). Capabilities are assessed comparative to the perceiving 
nation, a country can either have inferior, equal or superior capabilities. Aspects of culture are 
important to consider because they are a constraining factor on policy choice and can affect 
emotional responses to the targeted country (Geva and Skorick 1999;  Herrmann and 
Fischerkeller 1995). Culture is measured in two ways, dichotomously as either inferior/different 
and similar or trichoutomously as inferior, similar and superior (Schafer 1997). Threat is the third 
factor the denotes image type. Threat is used to describe whether the targeted nation is a threat to 
to the country, an opportunity to exploit or a chance for mutual gain (Herrmann and Fischerkeller 
1995). The combination of these three factors denote the category or image type that the target 
nation is ascribed.  
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The seven image types are the ally, enemy, degenerate, rogue, imperialist, colony, and 
barbarian. The ally image is used to describe a country that is considered equal in capabilities, 
culture and is not perceived as a threat. The ally is expected to have similar or compatible goals 
as the perceiving state (Alexander et al. 2005). The ally is perceived to have good intentions with 
a many decision makers (Cottam et al 2010). Countries that are perceived as allies, are expected 
to ―pursue mutually beneficial economic relations and to cooperate in peaceful joint efforts to 
protect and improve the global environment‖ (Herrmann et al 1997, p 411). Strategies that are 
employed when a country is perceived as an ally are cooperative, allies are perceived to have 
mutual confidence, a common cause and institutionalized alliances (Herrmann and Fischerkeller 
1995). Expected emotional responses from invoking the ally image are a positive affect, with 
trust and confidence in the ally country. A contemporary example would be the relationship 
between the United States and the United Kingdom.  
Opposite of the ally image is the often studied enemy image. The enemy image is 
characterized as a country that has equal capabilities, equal cultural sophistication, but harmful 
or threatening intentions (Cottam et al 2010). The enemy image is expected to be a high threat 
against the perceiving country. The decision making body is a small elite (Cottam et al 2010). 
The enemy is often characterized as evil and opposite of the perceiving country (Herrmann et al 
1997). Strategies employed include containment of and protection against the enemy (Herrmann 
and Fischerkeller 1995). Emotional responses to the enemy image are anger, frustration, envy, 
jealousy, fear, distrust and a grudging respect (Cottam et al 2010). The Soviet Union was often 
characterized within the framework of the enemy image. This image is particularly resistant to 
change (Herrmann 1986).  
The degenerate image is invoked to describe a country that has superior or equal 
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capabilities, a weak-willed culture and presents an opportunity (Cottam et al 2010). The 
degenerate image has harmful intentions with a confused or differentiated decision making unit 
(Cottam et al 2010). Leaders of degenerate countries are concerned with ―preserving what they 
have than with a vision for the future and have accepted their fall from greatness‖ (Herrmann et 
al 1997). Policy options would include deterrence and attempts to build an alliance with the 
country (Herrmann and Fischerkeller 1995). Emotions that are associated with the degenerate 
image include disgust, contempt, scorn and anger (Cottam et al 2010). An example of a 
degenerate is Saddam Hussein's perception of the United States prior to the invasion in 2003 
(Cottam et al 2010).  
Invocation of the barbarian image denotes a country that has superior capabilities, an 
inferior culture, and posses a high threat to the country. The barbarian image has harmful 
intentions with a small elite making the decisions (Cottam et al 2010). The goals of the barbarian 
country are incompatible with the perceiving country (Alexander et al 2005). Policy options 
against a barbarian country include augmentation of power and search for allies willing to 
cooperate against the barbarian (Cottam et al 2010). Emotions invoked by the barbarian image 
include disgust, anger and fear (Cottam et al 2010). Examples include Israeli perceptions of the 
Arab world (Cottam et al 2010).  
The imperialist image is ascribed to a country that has superior capabilities, superior 
culture, and poses a threat to the perceiving country (Cottam et al 2010). The imperialist country 
has exploitative intentions with a small number of decision making groups (Cottam et al 2010). 
The goals of the imperialist country and the perceiving country are incompatible (Alexander et al 
2005). Policy options include avoiding interventions, reduction in access to resources for the 
imperialist country, submission if the country is too powerful or revolt when possible (Herrmann 
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and Fischerkeller 1995; Cottam et al 2010). Associated emotions include fear of the imperial 
power, respect from subordinate, jealousy, anger, and shame from the subordinate while a 
paternalistic emotion is often felt by the imperial power (Cottam et al 2010). 
The colonial image is connected to the imperial image. The colonial country has inferior 
capabilities and culture (Cottam et al 2010). They present a high opportunity for the perceiving 
country (Cottam et al 2010). They are expected to have benign intentions with a small governing 
elite (Cottam et al 2010). They are often viewed as ―well meaning children who need tutelage‖ 
(Herrmann et al 1997). Policy options include exploitation and insurance of the client 
relationship (Cottam et al 2010; Herrmann and Fischerkeller 1995). Emotions activated in the 
imperialist country include disgust, contempt and pity (Cottam et al 2010). Examples include 
Guatemala in 1954, and potentially Guam and Puerto Rico. 
The newest addition to image theory is the rogue image. The rogue state developed after 
the Cold War with the new emphasis in foreign policy on terrorism and outlaw regimes (O'Reilly 
2007). The rogue state is characterized by an inferior capability, inferior culture, and moderate 
threat (Cottam et al 2010). The rogue state rejects the norms of the society states and is 
unpredictable (O'Reilly 2007). The decision making body is small with harmful intentions 
(Cottam et al 2010). Crushing the rogue state is the preferred policy option when dealing with a 
rogue state. Emotions attributed to the use of the rogue image include fear, anxiety, and 
uncertainty. An example of the rogue country is the portrayal of Iraq in 2003 by President Bush 
(O'Reilly 2007). 
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Coding Schemes  
Coding schemes for speeches should be developed that assess what image of a target 
country a leader invoked in his or her speech. Coding schemes should be based on the three 
criteria developed by Herrmann et al (1997). Speeches should be assessed for image type in a 
similar way that operational code assesses leaders‘ speeches for belief systems (e.g. Walker, 
Schafer, and Young 1999).  Specific detail should be paid to coding perceptions of threat. 
Perception of threat is indicative of a higher likelihood to support military action and this 
concept needs to be incorporated into the coding scheme (Huddy et al. 2005).  
In order to assess the image type that a leader invokes in a speech a coding scheme is 
necessary. A coding scheme will enable researchers to assess the image types invoked by 
political leaders in a replicable manner. Speeches should be coded based on the use of specific 
words that asses how the leader is attempting to portray the target country to their population. A 
detailed list of these words for each image type is included in the table. Examples include evil an 
Table 1: Image Types and 
Expectations
Image Culture Capabilities Threat/Opportunity Actions
Enemy Equal Equal Threat High Containment
Ally Equal Equal Threat/Opportunity
Degenerate Inferior Strong
Barbarian Inferior Superior Threat High
Imperialist Superior Superior Threat High
Colonial Inferior Inferior Opportunity High
Rogue Inferior Inferior Threat Moderate/Low Crush
Negotiate Common 
Strategy
Opportunity 
High/Moderate
Challenge Take 
Risks
Search for Allies 
Augment Power
Submit/Revolt when 
Possible
Control, Direct, 
Exploit
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indicator of the enemy image and friend as an indicator of the ally image. Words such as anger 
are included on more than one image types and should count towards all applicable image types. 
At the developmental stage of a coding scheme word counts should be used to indicate which 
image a leader invokes. All image types should be assessed to see how the word choices match 
public opinion. The word counts should be presented as percentages of words that apply towards 
an image. The image with the largest percentage is the image that the leaders invokes. No 
threshold for declaring a speech a specific image type should be established to discover if there 
are minimal effects for image types. It is possible for a speech to be lacking in image types and 
for a leader to attempt to invoke more than one image type. Due to the nature of political 
speeches it is also important to assess whether the coding schemes for speeches are appropriate 
characterizations of each image. The coding schemes should be tested in experimental settings 
replicating previous work on the enemy image and ally image to indicate if they connect with the 
appropriate schemas and lead to the appropriate policy implications (e.g. Herrmann et al. 1997; 
Geva and Hanson 1999).  
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Table 2: Coding Scheme and 
Emotions
Image Type Corresponding Words Emotions
Enemy
Ally
Degenerate
Barbarian
Imperialist
Colonial
Rogue
Enemy, Evil, Bad, Dishonest, 
Untrustworthy, Devil, Powerful, Covert, 
Authoritarian, Manipulative, Antagonistic, 
Deceptive, Aggression, Immoral, Threat, 
Anger, Fear, Animosity, Conflict, Foe, 
Competition, Detriment, Deceitful, 
Attitude, Severe, Combative, Delusional, 
Cancer, Assault
Anger
Frustration
Envy
Jealousy
Fear
Distrust
Grudging Respect
Friend, Coalition, Willing, Democracy, 
Democratic, Shared Values, Colleague, 
Support, Common, Goals, Similar, 
Special, Relationship, Good, Moral, 
Confidant, Team, Agreeable, 
Trustworthy, Powerful, United, Cohesive, 
Brotherhood, Alliance, Beneficial, 
Cooperative, Symbiotic, Loyalty
Confidence
Trust
Positive Affect
Happy
Uniformed, Apathetic, Backward, 
Previous Glory, Apprehension, 
Unorganized, Failure, Contempt, 
Decaying, Declining, Aging, Sinking, 
Settling, Dwindling
Disgust
Contempt
Scorn
Anger
Hatred
Threat, Immoral, Inferior, Different, 
Strong, Mean, Vindictive, Aggressive, 
Unjustified, Illegitimate, Jealous, Dictator, 
Nationalist, Cold Hearted, Frightening, 
Unpredictable, Unruly, Primitive, 
Uncultured, Ruthless, Animal, Rebel
Disgust
Anger
Fear
Respect, Fear, Improve, Superior, Anger, 
Jealous, Exploit, Arrogant, Disregard, 
Insensitive, Convert, Imperial, Forceful, 
Opportunistic, Selective, Bully, Wealthy, 
Manipulate, Supreme, Insatiable, 
Dominant
Fear of Imperialist
Respect from Subordinates
Jealousy
Anger 
Shame
Weak, Neutral, Friendly, Non-
Threatening, Child, Innocent, Blameless, 
Apathetic, Drain, Undeveloped, 
Disadvantaged, Ignorant, Inexperienced, 
Followers, Helpless, Lacking, Protect, 
Incapable, Dependent, Powerless
Disgust
Contempt
Pity
Rogue, Unpredictable, Unorganized, 
Destructive, Misguided, Rebel, Terror, 
Illegitimate, Immoral, Future, Threat, 
Anger, Fear, Anxiety, Lesson, Renegade, 
Non-Conforming, Innovative, Defend, 
Aggressive, Unmerciful, Demeaning, 
Oppressive, Dominating
Anxiety
Fear
Uncertainty
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Future Test 
The test case for this study will use Iran as an example case of an enemy country. Iran was 
chosen based on current sentiment and portrayal of Iran as an enemy of the United States. 
Testing Iran as an enemy was chosen because of the longer history of testing the enemy image 
over the rogue image. The enemy image has been used in several experimental evaluations with 
success (e.g. Schafer 1997; Herrmann et al 1997). The rogue and barbarian image have both been 
investigated more recently (e.g. Alexander et al. 2005; O'Reilly 2007). It is also possible that in 
the post-9/11 world there are only two image types, us and them.  
One of the weaknesses of previous tests of image theory is a lack of assessments of 
emotive responses. In order to avoid this problem a be a pre-test will be administered prior to 
exposure to the speeches to determine current emotional status and perceptions of Iran and other 
countries. After the pre-test a speech will be read by the participant. The speech will either 
portray Iran as an enemy of the United States or the facts of the current situation between Iran 
and the United States. The construction of Iran as an enemy will follow the prescribed 
attributions of enemy image, equal capabilities and culture with high threat. Words that are listed 
in the coding section as denoted of the enemy image will be used throughout the speech. Both 
treatments will contain the same policy prescriptions. After reading the information on Iran, 
participants will be asked to complete a political knowledge survey. Following the political 
knowledge survey, they will be asked a series of questions about Iran to assess their emotional 
responses and opinions after reading the speech. Participants will also be asked about their policy 
preferences. 
Further Research 
 Further research needs to look at specific images to discover how these images can be 
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used by political leadership to influence public opinion. Previous scholarship does not directly 
address the concept of linking different image types to support for political actions. Geva and 
Skorick (1999) provide a basis for looking at the ally and rogue image with evidence showing 
support for types of policy that differ with the image invoked. Further research needs to evaluate 
whether support for policies is dependent on the image invoked in political speeches or some 
underlying factor. It will be important to understand if image type variations produce different 
responses within the public. The research should address what images leaders use when they are 
more successful. Research also needs to look at how image theory is expected to perform in 
democracies outside of the United States.  
Given that the political climate in 2011 is very different from the climate during the Cold 
War when image theory was first developed and tested, it is important to reassess the 
appropriateness of the seven image types. Research should determine whether the public still 
responds to image types with the expected emotional responses and policy preferences. 
Hypotheses should address the individual image types and expectations. Potential hypotheses 
include: The enemy image will have the strongest emotional response. The rogue image is a 
definable image type, different than the enemy image. The ally image will increase emotions of 
trust and friendship towards the target country.  
Image theory has rarely been studied outside of the United States, though there is a 
notable exception, recent assessment of Lebanese perceptions of the United States (Alexander et 
al. 2005). With the newly developed coding scheme, researchers can determine if specific image 
types are culturally dependent. Research can determine if Prime Ministers and President have 
differing abilities to influence public opinion using image types. Source of image type should be 
explored such as the ability of the media or party to invoke image types. Potential hypotheses to 
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be explored include: There is no difference between a Prime Minister and a Presidents ability to 
influence public opinion using image types. President Bush's portrayal of the world as us and the 
terrorists effectively created two images in within the United States public, ally and image. 
Western countries perceive the world in terms of ally and enemy only. All countries can be 
influenced to perceive the different image types.  
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Chapter V: Conclusion 
This thesis set out to establish a theoretical framework merging literature on public 
opinion and foreign policy with literature on image theory. A research program was designed to 
test if the political leader of a country is able to influence public opinion through the use of 
discursive images in speeches. A new coding scheme for political speeches was developed to 
establish use of image type by the political leader to understand if speeches can shift public 
opinion in the expected way. To test this new application of image theory a research design was 
suggested using Iran as a test case. This research design will be carried out in future research. It 
is important to assess whether the seven image types described in the literature are still relevant 
today and whether they resonate with countries outside of the United States. This thesis proposes 
future research to test the applicability of image theory to other countries. Public opinion is an 
important tool for policy makers; therefore it is important to understand how public opinion can 
be created and influenced.  
 
 
53 
 
References 
Alexander, Michele G, Shana Levin, and P. J Henry. 2005. ―Image Theory, Social Identity, and 
Social Dominance: Structural Characteristics and Individual Motives Underlying 
International Images.‖ Political Psychology 26(1): 27-45. 
Almond, Gabriel. 1977. The American people and foreign policy. Westport  Conn.: Greenwood 
Press. 
Baker, William D., and John R. Oneal. 2001. ―Patriotism or Opinion Leadership?: The Nature 
and Origins of the "Rally ‗Round the Flag" Effect‘.‖ The Journal of Conflict Resolution 
45(5): 661-687. 
Bartels, Larry M. 2000. ―Partisanship and Voting Behavior, 1952-1996.‖ American Journal of 
Political Science 44(1): 35-50. 
Baum, Matthew A., and Philip B.K. Potter. 2008. ―The Relationships Between Mass Media, 
Public Opinion, and Foreign Policy: Toward a Theoretical Synthesis.‖ Annual Review of 
Political Science 11(1): 39-65. 
Belknap, George, and Angus Campbell. 1951. ―Political Party Identification and Attitudes 
Toward Foreign Policy.‖ The Public Opinion Quarterly 15(4): 601-623. 
Boettcher, William A., and Michael D. Cobb. 2009. ―‗Don‘t Let Them Die in Vain‘: Casualty 
Frames and Public Tolerance for Escalating Commitment in Iraq.‖ Journal of Conflict 
Resolution 53(5): 677-697. 
Borrelli, Stephen, and Brad Lockerbie. 2008. ―Framing Effects on Public Opinion During Prewar 
and Major Combat Phases of the U.S. Wars with Iraq.‖ Social Science Quarterly 89(2): 
502-522. 
Brader, Ted. 2011. ―The Political Relevance of Emotions: ‗Reassessing‘ Revisited.‖ Political 
Psychology 32(2): 337-346. 
Caspary, William R. 1970. ―The ‗Mood Theory‘: A Study of Public Opinion and Foreign Policy.‖ 
The American Political Science Review 64(2): 536-547. 
Chong, Dennis, and James N. Druckman. 2007. ―Framing Theory.‖ Annual Review of Political 
Science 10(1): 103-126. 
Cohen, Bernard. 1973. The Public’s Impact on Foreign Policy. Boston: Little, Brown and 
Company. 
Cohen, Jeffrey. 2003. The presidency. New York: McGraw-Hill. 
Cohen, Jeffrey E. 1995. ―Presidential Rhetoric and the Public Agenda.‖ American Journal of 
Political Science 39(1): 87-107. 
 
54 
 
Cohen, Jeffrey E, and John A Hamman. 2003. ―The Polls: Can Presidential Rhetoric Affect the 
Public‘s Economic Perceptions?‖ Presidential Studies Quarterly 33(2): 408-422. 
Conover, Pamela Johnston, and Stanley Feldman. 1984. ―How People Organize the Political 
World: A Schematic Model.‖ American Journal of Political Science 28(1): 95-126. 
Converse, Philip E. 1964. ―The Nature and Origina of Belief Systems in Mass Publics.‖ In 
Ideology and Discontent, ed. D. Apterl. New York: Free. 
Cottam, Martha. 1985. ―The Impact of Psychological Images on International Bargaining: The 
Case of Mexican Natural Gas.‖ Political Psychology 6(3): 413-440. 
Cottam, Martha, Beth Dietz-Uhler, Elena Mastors, and Thomas Preston. 2010. Introduction to 
political psychology. 2nd ed. Hove: Psychology Press. 
Cottey, Andrew. 2006. Security in the new Europe. London: Palgrave. 
Cross, Mai‘a Davis. 2007. ―An EU Homeland Security? Soveignty vs. Supranational Order.‖ 
European Security 16(1): 79-97. 
Dahl, Robert A. 1989. Democracy and Its Critics. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 
Dalton, Russel, and Robert Duval. 1986. ―The Political Environment and Foreign Policy 
Opinions: British Attitudes Toward European Integration, 1972-1979.‖ British Journal of 
Political Science 16(1): 113-134. 
Dalton, Russell J., Paul A. Beck, and Robert Huckfeldt. 1998. ―Partisan Cues and the Media: 
Information Flows in the 1992 Presidential Election.‖ The American Political Science 
Review 92(1): 111-126. 
Druckman, James. 2004. ―Political Preference Formation: Competition, Deliberation, and the 
(Ir)relevance of Framing Effects.‖ American Political Science Review 98(04): 671-686. 
Druckman, James N. 2008. ―On the Limits of Framing Effects: Who Can Frame?‖ The Journal 
of Politics 63(04). 
Duke, Simon. 2002. ―CESDP and the EU Response to 11 September: Identifying the Weakest 
Link.‖ European Foreign Affairs Review 7: 153-169. 
Dunegan, Kenneth. 1993. ―Framing, Cognitive Modes, and Image Theory: Toward an 
Understanding of a Glass Half Full.‖ Journal of Applied Psychology 78(3): 491-503. 
Eichenberg, Richard. 1989. Public opinion and national security in Western Europe. Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press. 
Eichenberg, Richard C, and Russell J Dalton. 2007. ―Post-Maastricht Blues: The Transformation 
of Citizen Support for European Integration, 1973–2004.‖ Acta Politica 42(2-3): 128-
152. 
 
55 
 
Eichenberg, Richard, and Russel Dalton. 1993. ―Europeans and the European Community: the 
Dynamics of Public Support for European Integration.‖ International Organization 47(4): 
507-534. 
Europa - The EU at a Glance. 2009. 
Fiske, Susan, and Shelley Taylor. 1984. Social cognition. Reading  Mass.: Addison-Wesley Pub. 
Co. 
Foyle, Douglas C. 2004. ―Leading the Public to War? The Influence of American Public Opinion 
on the Bush Administration‘s Decision to go to War in Iraq.‖ International Journal of 
Public Opinion Research 16(3): 269-294. 
GARTNER, SCOTT SIGMUND. 2008. ―The Multiple Effects of Casualties on Public Support 
for War: An Experimental Approach.‖ American Political Science Review 102(01): 95-
106. 
Geva, Nehemia, and Christopher Hanson. 1999. ―Cultural Similarity, Foreign Policy Actions, 
and Regime Type Perception: An Experimental Study of International Cues and 
Democratic Peace.‖ Political Psychology 20(4): 803-827. 
Geva, Nehemia, and J. Mark Skorick. 1999. ―Information Inconsistency and the Cognitive 
Algebra of Foreign Policy Decision Making.‖ International Interactions 25(4): 333-362. 
Gross, Kimberly, and Paul R. Brewer. 2007. ―Sore Losers: News Frames, Policy Debates, and 
Emotions.‖ The Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics 12(1): 122 -133. 
Haider-Markel, Don, and Mark Joslyn. 2009. ―A Partisan Education? How Education Extends 
Partisan Division over Facts.‖ 
Hermann, Richard. 2003. ―Image Theory and Strategic Interaction in International Relations.‖ In 
Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology, eds. David Sears, Leonie Huddy, and Robert 
Jervis. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 285-314. 
———. 1986. ―The Power of Perceptions in Foreign-Policy Decsion Making: Do Views of the 
Soviet Union Determine the Policy Choices of American Leaders?‖ American Journal of 
Political Science 30(4): 841-875. 
Herrmann, Richard K., and Michael P. Fischerkeller. 1995. ―Beyond the Enemy Image and Spiral 
Model: Cognitive?strategic Research After the Cold War.‖ International Organization 
49(03): 415-450. 
Herrmann, Richard, James Voss, Tonya Schooler, and Joseph Ciarrochi. 1997. ―Images in 
International Relations: An Experimental Test of Cognitive Schemata.‖ International S 
41: 403-433. 
Hetherington, Marc J., and Michael Nelson. 2003. ―Anatomy of a Rally Effect: George W. Bush 
 
56 
 
and the War on Terrorism.‖ PS: Political Science & Politics 36(01). 
http://www.journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S1049096503001665. 
Holsti, Ole. 1967. ―Cognitive Dynamics and Images of the Enemy.‖ Journal of International 
Affairs 21(1): 16-39. 
———. 2002. ―Public Opinion and Foreign Policy Analysis: Where We Were, Are, and Should 
Strive to Be.‖ In Millennial Reflections on International Studies, eds. M. Brecher and F. 
Harvey. Michigan: Michigan University Press, p. 514-528. 
Holsti, Ole R. 1992. ―Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: Challenges to the Almond-Lippmann 
Consensus Mershon Series: Research Programs and Debates.‖ International Studies 
Quarterly 36: 439-466. 
Hooghe, Liesbet, and Gary Marks. 2004. ―Does Identity or Economic Rationality Drive Public 
Opinion on European Integration?‖ PS: Political Science & Politics 37(03): 415-420. 
———. 2007. ―The Sources of Euroscepticism: Introduction.‖ Acta Politica 42(2): 119-127. 
Huddy, Leonie, Stanley Feldman, Charles Taber, and Gallya Lahav. 2005. ―Threat, Anxiety, and 
Support of Antiterrorism Policies.‖ American Journal of Political Science 49(3): 593-
608. 
Iyengar, Shanto, and Donald R. Kinder. 1989. News That Matters: Television and American 
Opinion. University Of Chicago Press. 
Jacoby, William G. 2000. ―Issue Framing and Public Opinion on Government Spending.‖ 
American Journal of Political Science 44(4): 750-767. 
Jentleson, Bruce W. 1992. ―The Pretty Prudent Public: Post Post-Vietnam American Opinion on 
the Use of Military Force.‖ International Studies Quarterly 36(1): 49-73. 
Jon Hurwitz, and Mark Peffley. 1987. ―How Are Foreign Policy Attitudes Structured? A 
Hierarchical Model.‖ The American Political Science Review 81(4): 1099-1120. 
Jordan, Donald L, and Benjamin I Page. 1992. ―Shaping Foreign Policy Opinions: The Role of 
TV News.‖ The Journal of Conflict Resolution 36(2): 227-241. 
Kim, Sei-Hill, Dietram A Scheufele, and James Shanahan. 2005. ―Who Cares About the Issues? 
Issue Voting and the Role of News Media During the 2000 U.S. Presidential Election.‖ 
Journal of Communication 55(1): 103-121. 
Kohut, Andrew. 2009. But What Do the Polls Show? How Public Opinion Surveys Came to Play 
a Major Role in Policymaking and Politics. Pew Research Center for the People & the 
Press. 
Lai, Brian, and Dan Reiter. 2005. ―Rally  ‘Round the Union Jack? Public Opinion and the Use of 
Force in the United Kingdom, 1948-2001.‖ International Studies Quarterly 49(2): 255-
 
57 
 
272. 
Livingston, Steven, and Todd Eachus. 1995. ―Humanitarian crises and U.S. foreign policy: 
Somalia and the CNN - effect reconsidered.‖ Political Communication 12(4): 413. 
Lodge, Milton, and Ruth Hamill. 1986. ―A Partisan Schema for Political Information 
Processing.‖ The American Political Science Review 80(2): 505-520. 
Lodge, Milton, and Charles S. Taber. 2005. ―The Automaticity of Affect for Political Leaders, 
Groups, and Issues: An Experimental Test of the Hot Cognition Hypothesis.‖ Political 
Psychology 26(3): 455-482. 
Loseke, Donileen. 2009. ―Examinging Emotion as Discourse: Emotion Codes and Presidential 
Speeches Justifying War.‖ The Sociological Quarterly 50: 497-524. 
Marcus, George E., and Michael B. Mackuen. 1993. ―Anxiety, Enthusiasm, and the Vote: The 
Emotional Underpinnings of Learning and Involvement During Presidential Campaigns.‖ 
The American Political Science Review 87(3): 672-685. 
Marcus, George, W. Russel Neuman, and Michael Mackuen. 2000. Affective intelligence and 
political judgment. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
McLaren, Lauren. 2004. ―Opposition to European Integration and Fear of Loss of National 
Identity: Debunking a Basic Assumption Regarding Hostility to the Integration Project.‖ 
European Journal of Political Research 43(6): 895-912. 
Mermin, Jonathan. 1997. ―Television News and American Intervention in Somalia: The Myth of 
a Media-Driven Foreign Policy.‖ Political Science Quarterly 112(3): 385-403. 
Miller, Warren E., and Donald E. Stokes. 1963. ―Constituency Influence in Congress.‖ The 
American Political Science Review 57(1): 45-56. 
Mintz, Alex, and Steven Redd. 2003. ―Framing Effects in International Relations.‖ Synthese 
135(2): 193-213. 
Monroe, Alan D. 1998. ―Public Opinion and Public Policy, 1980-1993.‖ The Public Opinion 
Quarterly 62(1): 6-28. 
Morgenthau, Hans J. 1954. Politics Among Nations; the Struggle for Power and Peace. 2nd ed. 
New York: Knopf. 
Mueller, John. 1973. War, presidents, and public opinion. New York: Wiley. 
Mueller, John E. 1971. ―Trends in Popular Support for the Wars in Korea and Vietnam.‖ The 
American Political Science Review 65(2): 358-375. 
Nelson, Thomas E., Rosalee A. Clawson, and Zoe M. Oxley. 1997. ―Media Framing of a Civil 
Liberties Conflict and Its Effect on Tolerance.‖ The American Political Science Review 
 
58 
 
91(3): 567-583. 
Nelson, Thomas E., Zoe M. Oxley, and Rosalee A. Clawson. 1997. ―Toward a Psychology of 
Framing Effects.‖ Political Behavior 19(3): 221-246. 
Oppermann, Kai, and Henrike Viehrig. 2009. ―The Public Salience of Foreign and Security 
Policy in Britain, Germany and France.‖ West European Politics 32(5): 925-942. 
Ostrom, Charles W, and Brian L Job. 1986. ―The President and the Political Use of Force.‖ 
American Political Science Review 80(2): 541-566. 
O‘Reilly, K. P. 2007. ―Perceiving Rogue States: The Use of the ‗Rogue State‘ Concept by U.S. 
Foreign Policy Elites.‖ Foreign Policy Analysis 3: 295-315. 
Page, Benjamin I, Robert Y Shapiro, and Glenn Dempsey. 1987. ―What Moves Public Opinion?‖ 
American Political Science Review 81(1): 23-43. 
Page, Benjamin I., and Robert Y. Shapiro. 1983. ―Effects of Public Opinion on Policy.‖ The 
American Political Science Review 77(1): 175-190. 
Parker-Stephen, Evan, and Corwin D. Smidt. 2009. ―Raising the Battle Cry: Communication 
Strategy and the Case of Iraq.‖ SSRN eLibrary. 
http://papers.ssrn.com/Sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1451403 (Accessed March 13, 
2010). 
Petersen, Michael Bang. 2010. ―Distinct Emotions, Distinct Domains: Anger, Anxiety and 
Perceptions of Intentionality.‖ The Journal of Politics 72(02): 357-365. 
Ragsdale, Lyn. 1984. ―The Politics of Presidential Speechmaking, 1949-1980.‖ American 
Political Science Review 78(4): 971-984. 
Rahn, Wendy M. 1993. ―The Role of Partisan Stereotypes in Information Processing about 
Political Candidates.‖ American Journal of Political Science 37(2): 472-496. 
Redlawsk, D. P., C. J. Tolbert, and W. Franko. 2010. ―Voters, Emotions, and Race in 2008: 
Obama as the First Black President.‖ Political Research Quarterly 63(4): 875-889. 
Redlawsk, David P. 2004. ―What Voters Do: Information Search During Election Campaigns.‖ 
Political Psychology 25(4): 595-610. 
Reese, Stephen D, and Seth C Lewis. 2009. ―Framing the War on Terror: The internalization of 
policy in the US press.‖ Journalism 10(6): 777-797. 
Robinson, John P. 1976. ―The Press and the Voter.‖ Annals of the American Academy of Political 
and Social Sience 427(Role of the Mass Media in American Politics): 95-103. 
Robinson, Piers. 1999. ―The CNN Effect: Can the News Media Drive Foreign Policy?‖ Review 
of International Studies 25(2): 301-309. 
 
59 
 
———. 1999. ―The CNN Effect: Can the News Media Drive Foreign Policy?‖ Review of 
International Studies 25(2): 301-309. 
Russett, Bruce. 1990. Controlling the sword : the democratic governance of national security. 
Cambridge  Mass.: Harvard University Press. 
Sbragia, Alberta. 2006. ―Introduction-The EU and Its "Constitution‘: Public Opinion, Political 
Elites, and Their International Context.‖ Political Science and Politics 39: 237-241. 
Schafer, Mark. 1997. ―Images and Policy Preferences.‖ Political Psychology 18(4): 813-829. 
Schattschneider, Elmer E. 1975. The Semi-Sovereign People: A Realist’s View of Democracy in 
America. 1st ed. Wadsworth Publishing. 
Scheufele, Dietram A, and David Tewksbury. 2007. ―Framing, Agenda Setting, and Priming: The 
Evolution of Three Media Effects Models.‖ Journal of Communication 57(1): 9-20. 
Shapiro, Robert Y., and Benjamin I. Page. 1988. ―Foreign Policy and the Rational Public.‖ The 
Journal of Conflict Resolution 32(2): 211-247. 
Shapiro, Robert, and Lawrence Jacobs. 2000. ―Who Leads and Who Follows? U.S. Presidents, 
Public Opinion, and Foreign Policy.‖ In Decisionmaking in a Glass House, eds. Brigitte 
Nacos, Robert Shapiro, and Pierangelo Isernia. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers, Inc., p. 223-245. 
Sinnott, Richard. 2000. ―Public Opinion and European Integration: Permissive Consensus or 
Premature Politicization.‖ In Decisionmaking in a Glass House: Mass Media, Public 
Opinion, and American and European Foreign Policy in the 21st Century, eds. Brigitte L 
Nacos, Robert Y Shapiro, and Pierangelo Isernia. Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers, Inc., p. 247-264. 
Sobel, Richard. 2001. The impact of public opinion on U.S. foreign policy since Vietnam : 
constraining the colossus. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Soderlund, Walter. 2008. Humanitarian crises and intervention : reassessing the impact of mass 
media. Sterling  VA: Kumarian Press. 
Stimson, James A., Michael B. Mackuen, and Robert S. Erikson. 1995. ―Dynamic 
Representation.‖ The American Political Science Review 89(3): 543-565. 
Thomassen, Jacques, and Hermann Schmitt. 1997. ―Policy Representation.‖ European Journal of 
Political Research 32: 165-184. 
De Vreese, Claes H. de, and Hajo G Boomgaarden. 2006. ―Media Effects on Public Opinion 
about the Enlargement of the European Union.‖ Journal of Common Market Studies 
44(2): 419-436. 
Walker, Stephen G, Mark Schafer, and Michael D Young. 1999. ―Presidential Operational Codes 
 
60 
 
and Foreign Policy Conflicts in the Post-Cold War World.‖ The Journal of Conflict 
Resolution 43(5): 610 - 625. 
Watts, Mark D., David Domke, Dhavan V. Shah, and David P. Fan. 1999. ―Elite Cues and Media 
Bias in Presidential Campaigns: Explaining Public Perceptions of a Liberal Press.‖ 
Communication Research 26(2): 144-175. 
Weaver, David H. 1996. ―What Voters Learn from Media.‖ Annals of the American Academy of 
Political and Social Sience 546(The Media and Politics): 34-47. 
Western, Jon. 2002. ―Sources of Humanitarian Intervention: Beliefs, Information, and Advocacy 
in the U.S. Decisions on Somalia and Bosnia.‖ International Security 26(4): 112-142. 
Worre, Torben. 1995. ―First No, Then Yes: The Danish Referendums on the Maastricht Treaty 
1992 and 1993.‖ Journal of Common Market Studies 33(2): 235-257. 
Zaller, John R. 1992. The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion. New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Zaller, John R., and Stanley Feldman. 1992. ―A Simple Theory of Survey Response: Answering 
Questions versus Revealing Preferences.‖ American Political Science Review 36(3): 
1099-1110. 
 
